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Recent Developments

In re Thomas J.:
Juveniles Have a Constitutional Right to a Speedy Trial Under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 21 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights
By: Brenda N. Taylor
n a case of first impression,
the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held juveniles have a
constitutional right to a speedy trial
under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and Article
21 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights. In re Thomas, 372 Md. 50,
811 A.2d 310 (2002). The court
further held when applying the
Barker test delays due to the State's
negligence are weighed against the
State. Id. at 76, 811 A.2d at 326.
In 1996, Thomas J.
("Thomas"), then fourteen years old,
was arrested for attempted robbery
and later released to his mother
("Mrs. 1.") after she signed a release
requiring her to notify the court ifshe
or Thomas moved. The court
issued a writ of attachment following
three unsuccessful attempts to serve
a summons because Thomas
moved. The writ was returned
when Thomas was seventeen.
Thomas filed a preliminary
motion to dismiss in the Circuit
Court for Prince George's County
on grounds he was denied a speedy
trial. The juvenile court denied the
motion. Thomas appealed and the
Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland reversed the judgment.
The Court ofAppeals of Maryland
granted certiorari to address the
issue of first impression, whether the

I

constitutional right to a speedy trial
applies to juvenile proceedings.
The court's analysis began with
a review of a juvenile's right to a
speedy trial. The court noted the
United States Supreme Court has
been reluctant to bestow all rights
constitutionally assured to adults in
criminal proceedings to state juvenile
proceedings. Id. at 58, 811 A.2d
at 315. The court determined that
relief must arise from a violation of
[Thomas '] due process rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
Rights guaranteed to Maryland
adult criminal defendants are not
guaranteed in juvenile proceedings.
Id. Rather than incorporate all
"adult" rights to juveniles, the court
of appeals approaches juvenile
rights in criminal prosecutions on a
"right-by-right" basis. Id.
Maryland Rule 11-114(b)( 1)
protects juveniles against delayed
proceedings when they are detained
and not given an adjudicatory
hearing within thirty days of court
ordered detention, or not detained
and not given an adjudicatory
hearing within sixty days after they
are served with the petition. In re
Thomas, 372 Md. at 61,811 A.2d
at 316-317. The court concluded
Rule 11-114(b)( 1) failed to protect
Thomas from substantial delay
because he was not detained and

recei ved the petition three years
and four months after his arrest. Id.
at 60, 811 A.2d at 316.
Next, the court looked to the
Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and Article
21 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights. Id. at 61,811 A.2d at 317.
The court based its federal
constitutional analysis on the
"essentials of due process and fair
treatment" established by the
Supreme Court in In re Gault, 387
U.S.'1 (1967). Id. at 64-65,811
A.2d at 319.
Noting that neither the
Supreme Court nor the court of
appeals had considered ajuvenile's
constitutional right to a speedy trial,
the court cited other jurisdictions
where the right to a speedy trial is
extended to youthful offenders in
juvenile proceedings. Id. at 66-67,
811 A.2d at 319-320. The court
held, "as a matter of fundamental
fairness," juveniles have a right to
a speedy trial under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and Article 21 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights
because speedy trials safeguard the
fact-finding process. Id. at 70, 811
A.2d at 322. However, the court
declined to establish a specific
length of delay that would violate
this right. In re Thomas, 372 Md.
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at 70, 811 A.2d at 322.
The court relied on case law
and the Supreme Court's four-part
balancing test established in Barker
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972),
subsequently adopted by the court
in Divver, to determine whether
Thomas' right to a speedy trial was
violated. Id at 72,811 A.2d at 323;
See Divver v. State, 356 Md. 379
(1999). The Barker factors include
1) the length of delay; 2) the reason
for the delay; 3) the accused's
assertion of the right to a speedy
trial; and 4) whether the accused
was prejudiced by the delay. Id at
72,811 A.2d at 323.
Beginning with the Barker
analysis, the court stated length of
delay "is a triggering mechanism and
is not necessarily ... sufficient to
compel dismissal." Id at 73, 811
A.2d at 324. In Divver, the court
held length of delay "is measured
from the date of arrest or filing of
indictment, information, or other
formal charges to the date oftrial."
Id Thomas' date of arrest was
January 18, 1996 and the writ was
returned on April 22, 1999, a delay
of three years and four months. Id
The court found the delay sufficient
enough to raise a presumption of
prejudice and compel the court to
consider the remaining three Barker
factors. In re Thomas, 372 Md. at
73, 811 A.2d at 324.
Next, the court considered the
reason for the delay. Id at 74, 811
A.2d at 324. Finding no evidence
the State intended to hamper
Thomas' defense, or that Mrs. J.
intended to elude the juvenile
proceedings by moving, the court
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opined the State is obligated to
make a reasonable attempt to locate
alleged delinquents. Id at 75, 811
A.2d at 325. Mrs. J. "reasonably
kept in contact" with authorities and
the State merely relied upon a writ,
causing the court to weigh the delay
against the State due to the State's
negligence. Id at 76, 811 A.2d at 326.
Whether an accused asserted
a right to a speedy trial is the third
Barker factor. Id at 76,811 A.2d
at 326. Thomas did not assert his
right to a speedy trial. Id. However,
in Brady v. State, 288 Md. 61
(1980), the court held when a
defendant is unaware of a charge, a
failure to demand a speedy trial
cannot be weighed against him. In
re Thomas, 372 Md. at 76, 811
A.2d at 326. Therefore, because
Thomas did not know about the
delinquency petition, the court did
not weigh this factor against him. Id
at 76, 811 A.2d at 326.
Concluding its analysis, the
court analyzed the fourth Barker
factor -- prejudice to the accused.
Id. at 77, 811 A.2d at 326.
Prejudice is assessed in light ofthree
interests established in Barker to
protect the constitutional right to a
speedy trial. The interests include:
1) prevention of oppressive pretrial
incarceration; 2) minimization of
anxiety and concern of the accused;
and 3) limitation of the possibility
that the defense will be impaired.
Id at 77,811 A.2d at 326.
The court determined Thomas
was not oppressively incarcerated.
Id The court further determined
Thomas did not state with particularity a claim of anxiety or con-

cern. Id at 78, 811 A.2d at 327.
However, the court opined the State
failed to meet its goal to minimize
the time between Thomas' arrest and
disposition to prevent anxiety and
psychological harm. In re Thomas,
372 Md. at 78, 811 A.2d at 327.
Although not dispositive, the court
concluded Thomas was neither anxious nor concerned. Id at 78, 811
A.2d at 327.
In assessing prejudice to the
accused, the court stated, "it speaks
more to a presumed prejudice"
because actual prejudice is difficult
to prove. Id The court also stated
substantial delays give rise to a presumption of prejudice. Id at 79,
811 A.2d at 327. The importance
of prejudice increases with the
length of delay. Id at 80, 811 A.2d
at 328(quoting Doggett v. United
States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992)). The
court held the three year and four
month delay presumptively
prejudicial and concluded that
Thomas's constitutional due process
and speedy trial rights were violated.
Id at 80, 811 A.2d at 328.
The Court of Appeals of
Maryland joined other jurisdictions
in recognizing, as a matter of
fundamental fairness, juvenile's
rights to a speedy trial. This
constitutional right, combined with
protections provided by Maryland
Rule 11-114(b)(1), will insure that
youthful offenders are not unfairly
prejudiced by substantial delays.
The onus is now upon Maryland's
juvenile justice system to fashion
appropriate measures to prevent
violations of Maryland juveniles'
rights to a speedy trial.

